David Schorr's concise examination of the origins of prior appropriation challenges this received wisdom in a careful analysis of archival material, legislative records, and court cases. 7 Schorr maintains that this history reveals that the prior appropriation doctrine so central to Western mining and water law was founded not on an attachment to privatization for its allocative efficiency but instead on principles of equity and justice. 8 Schorr's account shows that distributional concerns dominated the thinking of the appropriation doctrine's architects, whose principal concern was that water law foster widespread use of the resource.
Consequently, riparian land ownership, the basis of common law water rights in the East and in England, was explicitly rejected in the Colorado Supreme Court's landmark decision of Coffin v.
Left Hand Ditch in 1882. 9 Riparianism threatened landowner monopoly of the scarce water resource and would have allowed speculation, 10 both of which were inconsistent with the ideology of the Radical Lockeanism that was dominant at Colorado's founding and which promoted equitable distribution of rights among small irrigators. 11 In addition to its rejection of 7 Schorr employs four types of historical evidence in support of his claim that the essence of prior appropriation was distributive justice and widespread use of water: 1) mining district codes (he examined some 78 of them (p. 9); 2) water law statutes of the Colorado legislature and the 1876 Colorado Constitution; 3) Colorado court decisions; and 4) contemporary primary sources and published works (p. 7). 8 Schorr quotes the Colorado Court of Appeals in the book's epigram to the effect that the prior appropriation doctrine was designed in light of the region's aridity on "principles of equity and justice" that would "control[] and limit[]" water use. Schorr, supra note 1, at vi (quoting Armstrong v. Larrimer County Ditch Co. 27 P. 235, 237 (Colo. Ct. App. 1891)). 9 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882), quoted by Schorr, supra note 1, at 1. 10 Although Schorr does not mention it, recognition of riparian rights also would have put the federal government, as the dominant landowner in the West, in control economic development. However, the federal government renounced claims to riparian rights to its grantees in the Mining Act of 1866 [cite] and the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C ss. 321-39. However, a kind of federal riparianism persisted in the form of federal reserved water rights, primarily for Indian reservations, but those rights are not enforced until quantified, which has happened only at glacial speed. On federal reserved rights, see Brett Birdsong, Reserved Rights, 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, chap. 37 (3 rd ed., Amy K. Kelley, 2013). 11 On Radical Lockeanism, see infra § I. riparianism, the other cardinal tenets of the Radical Lockean policy of widespread use, according to Schorr, were a "sufficiency principle" in which appropriators secured enough water to carry out their immediate primary purpose of mining or farming, public ownership of water, and the doctrine of beneficial use as both the basis and measure of a water right (pp. 20, 106). Temporal priority was a mere incident to these foundation principles.
This review essay examines Schorr's arresting claim that the origins and significance of prior appropriation water law have been misunderstood, by both its proponents 12 and opponents. 13 Section I focuses on the founding of the doctrine and its anchor in Radical Lockean thought.
Section II turns to the fundamental of ethic of widespread use underlying prior appropriation law, which required rejecting riparianism. Section III examines the sufficiency principle that ensured that appropriators had enough water to effectively mine or farm, but not more than that, and which relegated priority to a tie-breaking function. Section IV explores the significance of the state of Colorado's longstanding declaration that the public owns all the water in the state. Section V evaluates the effect of Colorado courts' interpretation of requirement of beneficial use and its attendant limits on alienability of water rights. Section VI considers Schorr's linkage of the state's bias against corporations to the formulation of the state's water law. The essay concludes that Schorr's perspective should appear in any AngloAmerican interpretation of property law as a credible alternative to the Demsetzian vision which claims that the natural progression of property is a progression toward unfettered 12 privatization. 14 But Schorr's vision may also be disturbing to advocates of public property, for he seems to suggest that small privatizations may be superior to publicly owned property.
I. The Radical Lockean Origins of the Colorado Doctrine
The received story about Western water law is that it grew up as a response to the region's aridity. West of the hundredth meridian, where rainfall drops precipitously, Western legislators and jurists considered the common law's riparian rights doctrine too wasteful. While not challenging that sentiment, Schorr shows that it was actually part of a larger expression of agrarian, populist sentiment that also limited distribution of public land to actual settlers, not absentee speculators and Eastern corporations. This agrarian world-view had roots in Republican ideology of the 17 th and 18 th centuries, and later in Jacksonian Democracy, finding expression in the post-bellum era in the work of the People's Party and farmers' alliances (p.
25).
The animating theme of Radical Lockeanism was that everyone should own some land, both for individual self-sufficiency and political independence. Widespread ownership of land was the key to an America of self-sufficient, independent Jeffersonian yeomen whose labor merited property rights but only in proportion to their labor. Thus, for 19 th century Lockeans, equality of opportunity was the dominant concern, not economic efficiency (p. 15). With its immense public land holdings, the West was the perfect laboratory to put Lockean theory-with its aversion to monopoly power, special privilege, and speculation-Into practice. Schorr quotes the Lockean sentiments in Jackson's veto of the Second Bank of the United State to the effect that "the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes" to 14 See Demsetz, supra note 4. the detriment of "farmers, mechanics, and laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors for themselves" (pp. 26-27). 15 To limit monopoly power and attendant speculation Radical Lockeans opposed property accumulation beyond that necessary for personal use as a violation of natural law, and therefore supported limits on property acquisition, while also being highly skeptical of corporate power.
Schorr claims that the framers of the Colorado water law doctrine were not simply reacting to the aridity of the climate but were practitioners of the same Radical Lockeanism that influenced the disposition of the federal public domain and the law of the mining camps. They were, in short, possessed of a pro-settler, anti-monopoly, anti-speculation fervor that limited the size of water rights to that which could be reasonably used, eviscerated the perceived monopoly enjoyed by landowners under the riparian water rights system of the East, required work as a condition of maintaining a water right, and gave those not adjacent to water courses the right to trespass on riparian owner lands to divert irrigation water (p. 30). According to Schorr, the 1876 Colorado Constitution, announcing recognition of the prior appropriation doctrine, reflected all of these Radical Lockean themes, and it also included another Radical Lockean sentiment by including significant restraints on corporate power (pp. [39] [40] . 
II. The Ethic of Widespread Use and the Abolition of Riparianism
For Schorr, the institution of prior appropriation in Colorado was more significant for its rejection of riparianism than for establishing temporal priority as the sine quo non of Western water rights. Territorial legislation gave non-riparians both the right to divert streamflows and rights-of-way for their diversions to allow the construction of ditches across land they did not own. (p. 33). Recognition of these rights amounted to an uncompensated attack on riparian rights (p. 34), the purpose of which was to prevent a water monopoly by landowners who otherwise would claim all the water by prior settlement (p. 47), a kind of first-in-time method of allocation but one rejected by the Colorado doctrine. Instead, the founders of the doctrine, fearing that wealthy capitalists and corporations would monopolize water through riparian rights, required water to be productively used, earned via Lockean labor (p. 49). Colorado doctrine not only aimed to combat landowner and corporate monopoly and associated speculation but was also a convenient anti-federal rule.
Rejecting riparianism freed up water for widespread distribution, which Schorr maintains was the essence of the Colorado doctrine. The doctrine was thus the water law analogue of federal land policies that limited the size of Preemption and Homestead Act claims to the amount of land which could be reasonably tilled by a farmer. Antipathy to concentrated property ownership-whether land or water-was a basic tenet of Radicalism Lockeanism. As Locke himself wrote: "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is than his share and belongs to others" (p. 26). 18 Applied to the Colorado frontier, this sentiment for widespread disbursement of property rights required repudiation of common law riparian water rights, which until the gold rushes of the mid-19 th century was the uniform AngloAmerican rule of water law.
III. The Sufficiency Principle and Role of Temporal Priority
One of the more inspired aspects of Schorr's analysis is his treatment of what he calls "the sufficiency principle." According to Schorr, the water law rules that came out of the Colorado mining camps specified that each appropriator should have enough water to accomplish his purpose. This was a kind of analogue to the mining codes' minimum claim size-sufficient for one person to work but providing a rough equality among miners by limiting the claim to one per person. Sufficiency was thus both a minimum and a maximum: ensuring 18 Citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ss. 27 & 31 at 17, 19 (Thomas P. Peardon, ed. 1952) (1690).
that there was enough water for one person to work a mine, run cattle, or grow crops, but not enough to create speculative wealth or monopolize the resource (pp. 15-16).
The principle of sufficiency served the chief goal of the Colorado doctrine-widespread distribution of water. Schorr claims that the sufficiency principle made the appropriation doctrine more like riparian sharing than is generally recognized (p. 17). But since in a watershort environment riparian sharing would quickly exhaust the resource to the detriment of all, sufficiency also incorporated temporal priority as a kind of tie-breaker. Where there were more claimants than available water, priority governed. Thus, Schorr contends that priority was only a secondary tool of the Colorado doctrine:
Priority was not the primary rule of decision for water rights [in Colorado]; the codes did not allow the pioneer to claim as much water as he wanted, or could physically divert. The primary rule was that each party was entitled to a proportionate share of the water. The element of priority acted as a supplementary principle, having legal effect in cases where there was not enough water for all the parties wishing to use the water to realistically do so (p. 18). 19 Schorr's research revealed that priority was mentioned only a small minority of Colorado mining camp codes and where it was, in used only to break ties when there was not sufficient water to meet an equal share for all claimants (p. 19).
Schorr locates the sufficiency principle in both section 4 of the first irrigation statute of the Colorado Territory in 1861 (p. 35) and section 13 of the territory's 1862 general incorporation statute (pp. [36] [37] . Under the latter, prior diversions were valid only if recognized as sufficient for mining or farming purposes, but not in excess of that. Sufficiency, 19 Emphasis omitted. Schorr proceeded to quote Supreme Court justice Stephen J. Field, a former miner, concerning the effect of the California miners' codes: "And they were so framed as to secure to all comers, within practicable limits, absolute equality in working the mines" (p. 18, citing Johnson v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878) (emphasis Schorr's). not priority, was the basis of the Colorado doctrine (p. 37). According to Schorr, had temporal priority dominated, it would have threatened the basic tenets of the agrarian philosophy of anti-speculation and anti-monopoly.
IV. Public Ownership of Water
The same Colorado Constitution that ratified prior appropriation as the litmus for water rights in the state declared that water was the property of the state (p. 40). This of course was a rejection of riparianism, in which water rights were ancillary to land ownership. Schorr quotes a former Colorado Supreme Court justice to the effect that "[t]he doctrine of water rights under our Constitution is a radical departure from the common law. At one stroke the aristocracy of 'riparian privilege' was swept away, and in its stead was established the common right of all our people to the beneficial use of water by appropriation. This was a great triumph of popular rights" (p. 40). 20 Schorr suggests that this communitarian perspective flowed from the notion that unlike the Demsetzian notion that the water was unowned-res nullius-and available for privatization though capture, water was actually public property, owned by the community-publici juris. Thus, water could be privatized only by fulfilling conditions stipulated by the state (p. 41).
Shorr observes that the framers of the Colorado doctrine distinguished public property in water from state ownership "who evidently had something like the public-trust doctrine with its limits on legislative power to dispose of a public resource, in mind for Colorado's water" (p. The Colorado Supreme Court repeatedly interpreted the Constitution's declaration of the public property character of water to favor individual irrigators over canal corporations. For example, the court upheld public control of water pricing on the ground that water was "properly part of the public domain" (p. 78). 21 The court also struck down water contracts that imposed charges unrelated to the cost of delivering the water (pp. 84-86). 22 The court even allowed consumers to terminate water contracts with canal companies when subsequently enacted price controls provided a lower price, based on the public's constitutional right to water and "the agrarian ideology of wide distribution of property to individuals" (p. 86). 23 Public ownership of water then not only swept away "the aristocracy of riparian privilege" (p. 40), it also justified public regulation of water to ensure widespread use of water by settlers at reasonable prices. Like acreage limits on Preemption and Homestead Act claims, public ownership of water was a vehicle in the struggle against monopolies, speculation, and concentrated wealth (pp. 160-61).
IV. Beneficial Use and Limits on Alienability
The requirement that water be used for beneficial purposes, announced for the first time in section 6 of the Colorado Constitution of 1876-which declared that the right to divert waters for beneficial uses "shall never be denied"-is now a cardinal tenet of western water law. 24 a diverter's right to that necessary to run the mill he was then operating (p. 58). 27 The court also used the beneficial use requirement to restrict the scope of or to invalidate appropriations with some frequency, including restricting the rights of those using water in excess of their demonstrated need (pp. 116-18). As one water commissioner noted, the vested nature of a water right was based on need, "[b]ut whenever that need ceases then it becomes the property of the public" (p. 118).
By functioning as a limit on the size of claims, the use limit served a Jacksonian-like egalitarian impulse (p. 49). Diversion without use was subject to forfeiture (p. 20), another attempt to prevent speculation and also served as a means of returning water to the common pool of unowned property. The court also invalidated ditch company "royalty charges;" ruled that actual use of water, not ditch construction, was the basis of a water right; and held that ditch companies, as common carriers, could not be the proprietor of diverted water (pp. 122-25). 30 And even though the court allowed water rights to be transferred separate from the land, it determined that the amount of water available for transfer was only that which did not injure downstream The court's upholding of the no injury rule is perhaps the best evidence of Schorr's claim that the goal of the Colorado doctrine was never efficiency; instead, it aimed to promote equitable opportunity, ensure widespread distribution of water, and prevent speculation.
Fostering these goals was more important to the framers of the Colorado doctrine than the allocative efficiency that would have resulted from rejecting the no injury rule.
V. The Bias Against Corporations
Beginning around 1870, investor-owned canal companies began to become the dominant form of water diversions in Colorado, a development that some contemporaries regarded as immoral profiteering on public resource (pp. 65-68). Antipathy to the rise of corporate influence was widespread, particularly among agrarian appropriators. As Schorr recounts:
. . . [C]orporate control of water posed a grave threat to hopes for western irrigation as a boon to the smallholding, independent yeoman ideal. Many influential Americans saw irrigation as a panacea for the social and economic ills plaguing Gilded Age America, with its rapid industrialization and urbanization: 'The future belongs to Arid America. There alone can the pollution safely expand; there alone can labor win independence; there alone can a new and better civilization be erected under the impulse of the new century about to be born.' Irrigation, its enthusiasts believed, would reinvigorate the homestead ideal, banish monopoly, and 'save the nation and the state for democracymaking possible small-scale autonomous communities, egalitarian harmony, and justice.' It would 'guarantee industrial independence, and the small farm unit, the equality of man,' while breaking up large landholdings and the power of corporations, returning power to the people. Cooperative ditch-building and ownership, through the vehicle of mutual companies, would bring to these farmers the benefits of independence, self-sufficiency, and social equality, obviating the need for outside capital (p. 69). 31
Development of irrigation infrastruction-which before had been the province of individual irrigators and mutual companies owned by groups of irrigators-was after 1870 increasingly 31 Citations omitted (Schorr cites numerous sources in footnotes 8-12 in chapter 4). Other courts reacted against the threats imposed by increasing corporate influence by upholding police power regulation and sometimes imposing public trust doctrine limits, but the Colorado courts employed public ownership of water and the beneficial use doctrine to curb speculation and corporate control (pp 74-75). For example, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld public control of water prices on public ownership grounds, with the court saying that water was a resource "properly part of the public domain" (p. 78). 33 The court also struck down "royalty" charges imposed on farmers that were unrelated to the costs of delivering the water to farms, denying canal companies property rights in water because "ownership of water should remain with the people, with a perpetual right to its use, free of charge, in the people" (p. 83). 34 A canal company was merely a "quasi-public servant or agent" of the people, with common carrier responsibilities-which the court concluded would have been subject to public control even absent the constitution's authorization of regulation of water companies (p. 83).
In these and other cases involving contractual prorationing rules, special corporate charters, and ditch easements (pp. 89-100), 35 Water, sunshine and air are natural elements, existing for the benefit and essential to the life of all . . . The universal law that water must be applied to 'a beneficial use' is in itself a denial of the right of ownership. What a man owns he may apply as he pleases. Water is public property . . . . When any other view of water ownership is admitted it will be time not merely for a kind but for a slave-driver. Private investment in works will always be protected, but private ownership of water will not be conceded until air and sunshine are sold in bottles (p. 101).
The purpose of public ownership was to distribute water widely among appropriators, keeping it from corporate speculation. As Schorr explains, "[p]roperty was 'public' when controlled by the broad population, regardless of whether it took the legal form of widely distributed private property or more concretely state or public assets. The important distinction was between property in the hands of the broad public and property in the hands of a powerful few- (1872), in which the territorial supreme court upheld the existence of an orally granted ditch right-of-way across neighboring riparian lands either on the ground that the right-of-way was in effect an easement by necessity under a relevant statute or due to a kind of quasiconstitutional interpretation, or that private property had to give way to the goal of widespread use of water (the three opinions in the case varied, pp, 55-56). According to Schorr, Yunker, not the Left Hand Ditch decision, was the foundation case of the Colorado doctrine because it emphasized the doctrine's primary object of affording equal access to water among riparian and non-riparian land owners (p. 57).
typically through corporations and 'monopolies'" (p. 102). Samuel Weil, the western water treatise writer of the era, described this "Jacksonian conception of property" as one in which the law made the consumers of water the property owners and reduced the corporate canal owners to the rank of common carriers (pp. 102-03). 36
VI. Conclusion
The Colorado Doctrine is a significant piece of scholarship, a persuasive assault on the the citadel that holds that the capture rule at the heart of the appropriation doctrin at the heart of western law and federal mining law was an efficiency-based rule unconcerned with distributional equity. Establishing property rights as a result of first capture-property by temporal priority-has long been celebrated as an antidote to the "tragedy of the commons." 37 This privatization by appropriation has been touted by libertarian thinkers as overcoming the inefficiencies of common property through private market transactions. 38 Western water law is seen as a paradigmatic example of this sort of private rights system. 39 Schorr shows that temporal priority was only a small part of the origins of appropriation water law in Colorado. Far more central than priority was the goal of distributing water widely to settlers without regard to wealth, a populist, Radical Lockean ideology that the framers of Schorr's account is altogether convincing in its claim that the founding of the prior appropriation doctrine has been misunderstood as an efficiency-oriented doctrine by law and 40 Schorr thus dismisses public choice theory as an explanation for the rise of the Colorado doctrine (pp. 148-51).
economics scholars. In fact, The Colorado Doctrine should be cited by Property and Natural
Resources Law texts as a counterweight to the Demsetzian notion that the conversion of common property to private property is primarily concerned with maximizing economic efficiency. In fact, Schorr shows that the origins of prior appropriation lie in distributional concerns: spreading property widely among those engaging in Lockean labor and avoiding speculation and monopoly, while promoting equaltiy. Schorr maintains that the real dichotomy between property rights in 19 th century Colorado was between widely distributed property and concentrated property (p. 161). These revelations are significant academic contributions.
But Schorr aspires for more. He maintains that the Colorado water experience has practical lessons for other impending decisions, like how to apportion climate change pollution credits, alleging that the problem may not be too much private property but too little, at least if the goal is to spread rights widely and avoid exploitation by powerful economic interests (pp.
157-58)
. 41 This argument is one that public property advocates may not find as persuasive at the rest of Schorr's book, for it assumes that public property is inevitably subject to "public choice theory" manipulations that assume that common property will be disproportionately distributed to the wealthy and the organized. 42 There is no doubt considerable truth to this prediction, but it is not an inevitable result of common property. 43 Another criticism of The Colorado Doctrine might be that the principal practical difficulty with its legacy today is that the doctrine allocated unlimited rights to appropriators when 41 Schorr also explains the potential effects of his argument on privatization of water supplies, public land rights, allocating rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, and privatizing public housing (pp. 153-60). 42 See Blumm, supra note 6. 43 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) .
hindsight suggests that limited terms were more appropriate to accommodate social, economic, and climatic changes that have occurred over the last century-and-a-half. Schorr makes no mention of the problem of the perpetuity of water law rights.
Despite these minor criticisms, the Schorr book is a tour-de-force in explicating the evolution of property rights in water. Its disclosure that at the center of the founding of prior appropriation law was a distributional concern with widespread spreading of water rights and an aversion to monopoly control by riparian landowners and corporate speculators makes a myth of the received understanding of the efficiency-based origins of western water law.
Moreover, Schorr's contention that the Colorado doctrine's recognition of the public nature of water was a means to accomplish small privatizations according to actual use fits with the Radical Lockean labor theory of property prominent among the populist philosophy of the midand late-19 th century. Every Property, Natural Resources, and Water law and history text should rely on The Colorado Doctrine for these principles and explain the book as a therepeutic corrective to standard law and economics explanation of the incentives to create private property out of common property.
